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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
IN THE 8UPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NO. 16419 
JOLENE STAHL, . 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH TRAN8IT AUTHORITY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a negligence action brought oy the appel-
lant against the respondent for injuries suffered in a 
motor vehicle collision. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case was heard by the Honorable Christine N. 
Durham, who granted a summary Judgment in favor of the 
respondent and held that Utah Code Annotated ~11-20-56 
barred appellant's claim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests that the summary judgment of the 
district court oe reversed and the case r~mandea to the 
district court for trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 9, 1976, near 3100 South and 2700 West 
in Salt Lake City, one of the respondent's busses, 
driven by an employee of the respondent, negligently 
collided with the rear end of an automobile ariven by 
Melissa Mounteer. The impact of this collision caused 
the Mounteer automobile, which was.turning left, to 
collide head-on with the automobile driven by appellant. 
As a result of the impact between the Mounteer vehicle 
and the appellant's vehicle, Hr. Mounteer, who was 
seated in the right front passenger seat, was thrown 
through the front window and killed. 
After the accident the appellant was taken to the 
emergency room of Valley west Hospital for examination. 
The appellant later returned to work, where she was 
called oy Mr. Thomas L. Vance, the insurance adJuster of 
the respondent, who wanted to come to see appellant at 
work and get a statement from her. Had Mr. Vance not 
made this request, the appellant would not have stayed 
at work. Mr. Vance came to appellant's work on the day 
of the accident and had her sign a statement about the 
accident. He also had the appellant sign a medical 
information release form and asked who her doctor was. 
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In addition, Mr. Vance gave the appellant his card and 
said he would be adjusting her claim. (R. 88, Deposi-
tion of Jolene Stahl, at 25-26). 
With these assurances that Mr. Vance was working on 
her claim, the appellant did not seek legal counsel. 
However, after approximately three and one-half months 
had passed without any action on her claim, appellant 
retained counsel to represent her on December 28, 1976. 
Appellant's attorney sent written notice of appellant's 
claim to the respondent and the Utah Attorney General on 
December 29, 1976. (R. 64). Appellant's attorney 
entered into negotiations with the respondent and its 
insurance adjuster, Mr. Vance. As late as January 14, 
1977, Mr. Vance was attempting to gather medical infor-
mation from appellant's doctor. (R. 63). Because of 
the refusal of respondent's insurance adjuster to settle 
her claim, appellant was forced to file a complaint in 
the district court on July 14, 1977. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATEU §11-20-56 DOES NOT BAR 
EITHER APPELLANT'S CLAIM OR ANY OTHER CLAIMS 
The critical issue in this case is whether this 
Court is going to read into Utah Code Annotated 
§11-20-56 a provision which the Utah Legislature did not 
include. In the case below, the d~strict court held 
that this statute barred claims not brought witnin 
thirty days. Appellant contends that U.C.A. §11-20-56 
does not bar appellant's claim or any other claim which 
is not presented to the respondent's board of directors 
within thirty aays of an accident. In stark contrast to 
the provision in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(U.C.A. S63-30-12) that a "claim against the state • 
shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed • 
within one year after the _cause of action arises," U.C.A 
Sll-20-56 merely states that claims against the respond-
ent "shall be presented to the board of directors in 
writing within thirty days" after an accident. There is 
no language in the statute which oars claims brought 
more than thirty days after an accident. 
The district court interpreted U.C.A. §11-20-56 in 
a way not permitted by the statute itself or by judicial 
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decis ions. As previously mentioned, the statute does 
not contain any language that c~aims are barred if not 
presented within thirty days. In addition, it has been 
consistently held Dy Judicial aecisions that "a court 
must not read into a statute provisions which the 
legislature did not include." Alexander v. Michigan 
Employment Security Commission, 4 Mich. App. 378, 144 
N.W.2d 850 (1966). ~ee also City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 
99 Ariz. 130, 407 P.2d 91 (1965)i Richardson v. City of 
San Diego, 193 Cal. App. 2d 648, 14 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. 
App. 1961). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also 
stated that "it is not tor the courts to add, Dy 
interpretation, to a statute, a requirement which the 
legislature did not see fit to include." Commonwealth 
v. Rieck Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 213 A.2d 277 
(1965). 
From the foregoing, it is clear that neitner the 
district court nor any court should read lanyuage into 
U.C.A. §11-20-56 tnat is not present within the statute. 
If "claims barred" language were read into the statute, 
it would produce an anomalous result. On the one hand, 
claims against local and state government (which absent 
the Utah ~overnmental Immunity Act could not be brought 
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at all) would be barred if not brought within one year, 
while claims against respondent UTA would be barred if 
not brought within one month. From the language of 
U.C.A. §11-20-56 it is obvious that the Utah Legislature 
did not intend to give the UTA greater rights than cities 
or the state. It is clear from the words used that the 
intent of the Legislature was merely to allow the respon-
dent to be notified of claims before any actions were 
brought. 
Since U.C.A. §11-20-56 does not bar claims, other 
statutes must be consulted to determine whether appel-
lant's claim was presented timely. Under U.C.A. 
§63-30-2(1), "The word 'state' shall mean the state of 
Utah or any office, department, agency, •• or other 
instrumentality thereof." Since respondent is an agency 
of the state, claims against it would be barred if they 
were not brought within one year after the cause of 
action arose. U.C.A. §63-30-12. In the present case, 
appellant complied with this statute by filing her 
notice of claim with the attorney general and respondent 
-0n December 29, 1976. ( R. 64). 
filed her complaint in this case 
within the one year period. 
In addition, appellant 
on July 14, 1977, well 
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II. ASSUMING UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §11-20-56 BARS 
CLAIMS, APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BECAUSE OF THE 
ACTIONS OF RESPONDENT'S INSURANCE ADJUSTER 
This Court has held that a lay person might be so 
deceived by the conduct of a governmental entity's 
insurance adjuster, that the governmental entity will be 
estopped from raising the matter of not filing a com-
plaint timely. Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 
2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). As was statea in Rice, "One 
cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a 
false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim to 
the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead that 
very delay as a defense to the action when brought." 
If this Court finds as a matter of law that U.C.A. 
§li-20-56 bars claims not brought within one month, it 
must also decide whether the evidence before the dis-
trict court raised an issue of material fact as to 
whether the conduct of respondent's adjuster was such as 
to induce appellant to delay the filing of her claim. 
The evidence before the district court in the form of 
appellant's deposition did raise an issue of material 
fact on this matter. 
Appellant testified in her deposition that respon-
dent's insurance adjuster, Mr. Vance, went to see her on 
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the day of the accident. At that time, he took appel-
lant's statement and secured medical information release 
forms. In addition, he gave appellant his card and told 
her that he would be adJusting her claim on behalf of the 
res~ondent. Mr. Vance did not inform appellant that she 
would have to contact anyone else representing the respon-
dent other than himself and did not tell her to seek an 
attorney. He continued to attempt to obtain medical 
information from appellant's doctor until as late as 
January 14, 1977. Assuming appellant had asked Mr. 
Vance whether she should contact the respondent, Mr. 
Vance would have told ner that she did not nave to 
because he handled all tne respondent's claims. (R. 87, 
Deposition of Thomas L. Vance, at 12). 
In light of the fact that appellant did not seek an 
attorney for the first three and one-ha~f months after 
the accident because of the conduct of respondent's 
insurance adjuster, it is difficult to accept respon-
dent's "soiled hands" argument that appellant's claim is 
barred because it was not brought to the board of 
directors within one month of the accident. At the very 
least, the conduct of respondent's insurance adjuster 
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raises a genuine issue of material fact that should be 
determined by the district court. 1 
III. ASSUMING U.C.A §ll-20-56 BARS CLAIMS, APPEL-
LANT'S CLAIM IS NUT BAR~ED BECAUSE RESPONUENT llliCEIVED 
NOTICE OF APPELLANT'S CLAIM WITHIN 30 UAYS OF THE 
ACCIDENT 
1. Appellant also contends that in addition to a waiver of 
the claim provision based upon the conduct of respondent's 
insurance adjuster, respondent waived its immunity by 
taking out insurance for this type of case. Justice 
Crockett has noted that in relation to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, it is the "manifest clear 
intent that where there is an insurance carrier it 
should not avail itself of protections which belong to 
the soverign entity." Rice v. Granite School District, 
23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969) (Crockett, J., 
concurring). See also Thomas v. droadlands Community 
Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 ~.E.2d 63b 
(1952) (immunity waived by school district to extent of 
its insurance); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: 
A Decade of Change, 1966 U. Ill. L.F. 919, 967; Note, 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: An Analysis, 1967 
Utah L. Rev. 12U, 147-48. 
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The thrust of respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was that appellant was barred from brin~ing the 
present action because she failed t9 file a written 
claim with respondent's board of directors witnin thirty 
days of the accident as allegedly required by U.C.A. 
§11-20-56. However, the undisputed facts are that the 
respondent received notice of appellant's claim as 
contemplated by u.c.A. §11-20-56 and that there was no 
way under the circumstances that appellant could have 
given better notice to respondent. 
On September 9, 1976 (the date of the accident), 
respondent received notice of appellant's claim and 
dispatcned its insurance adjuster, Thomas L. Vance, to 
obtain a written statement by appellant of her version 
of the accident. (R. 87, Deposition of Thomas L. Vance, 
at 5). Mr. Vance obtained this written statement on the 
day of the accident and since that time, respondent was 
aware of appellant's claim and had opportunity to inves-
tigate it. Mr. Vance testified in his deposition that 
he did not tell the appellant to present her claim to 
the respondent because the claims of the respondent were 
handled directly by him. 
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Q (By Mr. Bennett:) Did you tell her that 
she should present any kind of a claim right to the 
Utah Transit Authority rather than through your 
company? 
A I definitely did not. 
Q Is there any reason why you aid not tell 
her that? 
A Yes. All claims, claims against the bus 
company, are handled directly by our off ice and 
specifically by myself. I never refer anyone to 
the bus company. In fact, if--well, I just don't, 
in any case. 
(R. 87, Deposition of Thomas L. Vance, at l~). 
Mr. Vance also testified that had the appellant 
filed a claim with the respondent directly, the 
respondent would merely have turned the claim over to 
him. (R. 87, Deposition of Thomas L. Vance, at 18). It 
is clear that the respondent, through its insurance 
adjuster, had notice of appellant's claim within thirty 
days of the accident. It is equally clear that had 
appellant filed her claim with responoent's board of 
directors, the board would merely have turned over the 
claim to its insurance ad]uster, Mr. Vance. Under these 
circumstances, respondent's argument that appellant's 
claim should oe oarred because she did not notify respon-
dent's board of directors is unacceptable. 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Annotated §11-20-Sb does not contain any 
language that bars appellant's claim. There was no way 
for appellant reading this statute to know that unless 
she filed her claim within thirty days, she would be 
barred from recovery. Even if this Court were to read 
language into the statute barring appellant's claim, the 
conduct of respondent's insurance adjuster presents a 
genuine issue of material fact that should be determined 
by the district court. 
For the reasons stated herein, the summary judgment 
of the district court should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the district court for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~Y.'78e~ 
'WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Attorney for Appellant 
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